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Abstract
We advocate and develop a states-based semantics for both nominal and ad-
jectival confidence reports, as in Ann is confident/has confidence that it’s rain-
ing, and their comparatives Ann is more confident/has more confidence that it’s
raining than that it’s snowing. Other examples of adjectives that can report
confidence include sure and certain. Our account leverages a neodavidsonian
account of adjectival comparatives in which the adjectives denote properties
of states, and measure functions are introduced compositionally. We further
explore the prospects of applying these tools to the semantics of probability
operators. We emphasize three desirable and novel features of our semantics:
(i) probability claims only exploit qualitative resources unless there is explicit
compositional pressure for quantitative resources; (ii) the semantics applies to
both probabilistic adjectives (e.g., likely) and probabilistic nouns (e.g., proba-
bility); (iii) the semantics can be combined with an account of belief reports
that allows thinkers to have incoherent probabilistic beliefs (e.g. thinking that
A & B is more likely than A) even while validating the relevant purely prob-
abilistic claims (e.g. validating the claim that A & B is never more likely than
A). Finally, we explore the interaction between confidence-reporting discourse
(e.g., I am confident that...) and belief-reports about probabilistic discourse
(e.g., I think it’s likely that...).
1 Introduction
A confidence report is a sentence like (1a). A reasonable assumption is that such
a report expresses a confidence relation between an attitude holder and a proposi-
tion. Importantly, however, such attitudes are gradable, as evidenced by the clear
acceptability and interpretability of (1b). Reports with confident are thus part of
a broader family of gradable attitude expressions, which includes verbs like want
and adjectives like sure/unsure and certain/uncertain.
(1) a. Ann is confident that it’s raining.
b. Ann is more confident that it’s raining than that it’s snowing.
Despite extensive research in linguistics and philosophy on the nature of propo-
sitional attitudes, the semantics of confidence reports is relatively under-theorized.
One reason for this might be the expectation that, once we have accepted a cer-
tain theory of gradable adjectives, we will have said everything of semantic signifi-
cance about confidence reports. For example, the derivation of (1b) in one standard
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framework would involve a function that maps propositions p and attitude-holders
a to a degree representing a’s confidence that p is true—in other words, confident
would lexically express a confidence measure.
We take a somewhat broader view on the distribution of confidence reports, and
suggest that a simple extension of the scalar analysis to confident is insufficiently
general; for example, it fails to extend neatly to confidence reports with nominal
confidence, (2a)-(2b). We thus advocate and develop an alternative semantics that
interprets confident as a property of states, measures of which can be introduced
compositionally in constructions like (1b) (Wellwood 2014, Wellwood 2015). This
alternative is motivated primarily by an intuitive semantic equivalence between
nominal and adjectival confidence reports in the comparative, as well as indepen-
dent data supporting a common Davidsonian analysis of confident and confidence.
(2) a. Ann has confidence that it’s raining.
b. Ann has more confidence that it’s raining than that it’s snowing.
The Davidsonian turn supports a degree of semantic flexibility that we prof-
itably exploit in our analysis of the bare, or ‘positive’, occurrences of confident (e.g.,
(1a), and their nominal counterparts) and when they occur in their comparative
forms. For instance, according to our proposal, the positive form involves refer-
ence to the initial ordering on states provided by confident/confidence, while the
comparative form involves reference to degrees introduced by more. This analysis
allows us to implement a novel account of the characteristic context-dependent in-
terpretation of such adjectival occurrences that does not make use of a covert pos
morpheme.
The resulting semantics is also flexible in that it allows us to model confi-
dence ascriptions to some agents who fall short of perfect rationality. Recent work
has led to the development of a variety of probabilistic frameworks for semantic
theories of probability operators. Embedding our account of confidence reports
within these frameworks would likely make it hard to assign confidence states to
non-probabilistic agents. The state-based framework we develop, by contrast, can
model confidence ascriptions to a variety of non-probabilistic agents. Moreover, it
does not require that the contents of confidence states be propositions, and thus it
does not require confidence ascriptions to be tied to particular kinds of contents.
Exploring this semantics can, as we show, provide a novel perspective on the
semantics of adjectives like likely and probable, e.g. (3). We argue that state-of-the
art proposals about the semantics and logic of probability operators can be injected
within our states-based framework. Furthermore, our proposal has some unique
advantages. For one thing, nominal probability claims, such as (4), are generally
overlooked in discussions of probability operators, but receive a natural analysis
on the states-based proposal that parallels adjectival probability claims.
(3) a. It is likely that it’s raining.
b. It is more likely that it’s raining than that it’s snowing.
(4) a. There’s a chance that it’s raining.
b. There is more likelihood that it’s raining than that it’s snowing.
For another, there seem to be inferential relations between comparative con-
fidence reports like (1b) and reports that an agent believes a certain probabilistic
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content. So in particular, (1b) sounds equivalent to Ann thinks that it’s more likely
to rain than to snow. We show how this equivalence can be captured, once our se-
mantics is supplemented with an account of the interaction between attitude verbs
and epistemic vocabulary. According to our proposal, both confident/confidence and
likely/likelihood are sensitive to ‘information structures’ (in a sense that we will de-
fine), but that associated with confident is relativized to an attitude-holder.
Finally, we claim that the extension of our framework to capture probability
operators provides an original and valuable insight into some vexed methodologi-
cal questions concerning their semantics. That is, we vindicate two desiderata that
seem impossible to reconcile on existing views. On the one hand, we avoid appeal
to probability functions in stating the semantics of simple sentences where likely
appears in sentences like It’s likely to rain. On the other, we vindicate appeals to
probability where they do seem needed, i.e. in an account of sentences like (5).
(5) a. It is 85% likely that it will rain.
b. It is three times more likely that it will rain than that it will snow.
c. There is a 10% likelihood of snow.
2 Confidence reports
We consider reports both with adjectival confident and nominal confidence, and
their interpretation in the positive and comparative forms, with an emphasis on
the latter. We show that extant thinking about gradable adjectives and mass nouns
pulls us in two different directions: the literature on gradable adjectives suggests
we should assign a measure function-based interpretation to confident, but the liter-
ature on mass nouns suggests we should assign a property-based interpretation to
confidence. Our observations and arguments suggest that a uniform analysis should
be given. We propose an analysis that assimilates the adjectival interpretation to
the nominal.
An initial attempt
Evidence abounds that confident (and the other adjectives in our target class) are
gradable. In addition to their comfortable occurrence in the comparative, (1b),
confident combines with the full panoply of comparative forms (e.g., as confident,
too confident, confident enough, etc.), and with modifiers like very and 100%. Thus
a plausible initial thought is that confident lexicalizes a degree semantics directly.
For example, assume that gradable adjectives like tall are assigned a measure
function type (e.g. Kennedy 1999), i.e. the type that maps individuals to degrees.1
In this framework, it would be straightforward to assign confident the interpre-
tation in (6), where conf maps a proposition p to x’s degree of confidence in the
truth of that proposition, and g is a variable assignment.2 Importantly, we needn’t
assume that degrees of confidence are probabilities, or indeed that they have any
structure besides what is provided by the standard scalar framework.
1A prominent alternative in the style of Heim 1985 analyzes them as having a higher quantifica-
tional type that embeds a measure function.
2This treatment parallels recent analyses of likely, such as Yalcin 2010, Lassiter 2011, 2015, 2016.
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(6) ~confidentg = λpstλxe.confx(p)
type 〈〈s, t〉,〈e,d〉〉
Positing such lexical entries is standardly accompanied by the assumption that
a covert morpheme, usually indicated by ‘pos’, is present whenever the adjective
occurs without overt degree morphology.3 While the details vary, the general func-
tion of this morpheme is to introduce comparison to a contextually salient standard
for the property denoted by the adjective. Given these assumptions, the LF of (1a)
has the additional structure indicated in (7a), and the truth conditions in (7b). This
says that Ann’s confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed by it’s raining
is greater than her standard for confidence in the context.4
(7) a. Ann is pos confident that it’s raining.
b. ~(1a)g = true iff confa(rain) ≥ standard(confa)
By design, adopting this framework makes simple work of the interpretation
of a comparative like (1b). In the style of Kennedy (1999), adjectival more is in-
terpreted as in (8), the core contribution of which is a strict greater-than relation
between degrees. Given the semantic value of the than-clause, d, and a measure
function µ (i.e., a map from the subject of the matrix clause to their degree of µ-
ness), a comparative like (1b) will express that Ann’s degree of confidence in the
truth of proposition rain strictly exceeds her degree of confidence in snow.
(8) ~moreg = λddλµedλxe.µ(x) > d
type 〈d,〈〈e,d〉,〈e, t〉〉〉
Now, so long as confident saturates its propositional argument prior to combi-
nation with more, everything will proceed as it should: the usual compositional
mechanisms will then deliver (9) as the interpretation of (1b).5 This is read, ‘Ann’s
degree of confidence in the proposition expressed by it’s raining is greater than her
degree of confidence in the proposition expressed by it’s snowing.’
(9) confa(rain) > confa(snow)
As promised, such a proposal is simple and elegant. But we will show that it is
insufficiently general.
3But see Rett (2015) for an attempt to deploy Gricean pragmatics to dispense with pos.
4The lexical entry for pos on a Kennedy-style account, in the present context of adjectives that
take propositional arguments, would look like:
(1) ~posg = λddλg〈st,ed〉 λpst .λxe. g(p)(x)  d
5Actually, the LF must look like the below, ignoring the copular verb and the internal structure
of the than-clause. We make the standard assumption that more is discontinuous with the than-clause








Confidence reports do not require gradable adjectives for their expression. One can
as easily express a confidence report with the mass noun confidence, (10), including
in the comparative form, (11). It is interesting to observe that (11) is intuitively
equivalent to (1b). We say more about equivalences below.
(10) Ann has confidence that it’s raining.
(11) Ann has more confidence that it’s raining than that it’s snowing.
To say that confidence is a mass noun is, so far, just to say that it has a certain
syntactic-semantic distribution: it appears comfortably with much, (12a), just like
other mass nouns both concrete (much mud) and abstract (much justice). Like these
nouns, it fails to appear comfortably with plural morphology, (12b), cardinal num-
ber words, (12c), or distributive quantifiers, (12d).6
(12) a. The men didn’t express much confidence that the globe is warming.
b. ? The women expressed their confidences that the globe is warming.
c. ? The reports suggested two confidence(s) that the globe is warming.
d. ? Each confidence was high.
What of the type of confidence? The more often studied ‘substance’ mass nouns
like water and coffee are typically assigned type 〈e, t〉, where it is understood that
the particular e-type things that such nouns are true of are very different than the
types of things that nouns like traffic cone and cup are true of. The same can be true
of a contrast like that between confidence and (the noun) party: the former is true
of things that hold while the latter is true of things that happen, etc.
These considerations suggest a blueprint for the semantic analysis. While we
will revise some details of this blueprint in the next section in response to a variety
of constraints, it will be useful to give a basic overview of the main ideas.
First, confidence expresses a property of states, the ‘mass’ subtype of the type of
eventualities, v.7
(13) ~confidenceg = λsv .confidence(s)
type 〈v, t〉
Then, the bare confidence report in (10) is interpreted in line with other neo-
davidsonian treatments of eventuality predicates.8 In (14), an existential claim
about states involves Ann as the ‘holder’ or ‘bearer’ of the state, and the proposi-
tion (if that’s what it is) expressed by rain is a thematic dependent which, for now,
6(12a) is negative because such occurrences of much have an NPI-like distribution; see Solt 2015.
7We choose the formulation ‘states’ for simplicity. Related possibilities for valuing the ss are, for
example, tropes tropes (e.g., Moltmann 2009) or abstract substances (Francez and Koontz-Garboden
2015). We have little to say about the metaphysics of such entities. All we require is that, whatever
they are, they show ordering relations and they have thematic participants.
8Assume that syntactic arguments map to conjuncts in logical form (cf. Castaneda 1967, Parsons
1990, Schein 1993, Pietroski 2005). Often, following especially Kratzer 1996, it is assumed that while
the external argument—in our cases, the phrase indicating the holder of the state—corresponds to a
conjunct in logical form, the internal argument fills an argument slot in the relation lexically denoted
by—in this case—a noun like confidence.
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we say plays the θ role in the state. For concreteness, θ(s,p) may be read ‘p is the
theme of s’, or even ‘p is the content of s’.9
(14) ∃sv[holder(s,a)∧ confidence(s)∧θ(s,rain)]
The comparative with confidence looks just like that with other mass nouns,
modulo the distinction between entities and eventualities carried by the types e
and v. In (15), a component of nominal more introduces the measure function (e.g.
Heim 1985, Bhatt and Pancheva 2004, Bale and Barner 2009; cf. Solt 2015). Here,
g(µ) stands for the value of g at index µ (one way of encoding context-sensitivity10),
s is an eventuality to be measured, and d is provided by the than-clause.
(15) ~moreµg = λddλsv .g(µ)(s) > d
type 〈d,〈v, t〉〉
Given these assumptions, the comparative (11) is interpreted as in (16), where
δ abbreviates the than-clause degree. This may be read, ‘there is a state of con-
fidence s that Ann is in with respect to the proposition expressed by it’s raining,
the measure µ of which is greater than δ.’ Given standard assumptions about the
derivation of the meaning of the than-clause, the value of δ in (11) is equivalent to
max(λd.∃sv[holder(s,a)∧confidence(s)∧θ(s,snow)∧g(µ)(s) ≥ d]), i.e., the maximal
degree to which Ann is in a state of confidence whose theme is rain.
(16) ∃sv[holder(s,a)∧ confidence(s)∧θ(s,rain)∧ g(µ)(s) > δ]
The upshot is that nominal confidence reports are states-based. Comparative
confidence reports in the nominal domain still involve confidence measures (i.e.,
g(µ) will map confidence states to degrees); yet, these measures are introduced
compositionally, not by the lexical noun.
Bifurcate or assimilate?
The semantics we have given so far for confident and for confidence add up to a
strange two-headed creature; call this the bifurcation analysis. We think there are
good reasons for rejecting this analysis.
First, the bifurcation analysis obscures what appears to be an intuitive equiva-
lence between comparative confidence reports that strand both sides of the nomi-
nal/adjectival divide. As far as we can tell, the requirements for the truth of Ann
is more confident that it’s raining and Ann has more confidence that it’s raining are
identical. On the bifurcation analysis, this equivalence is obscured: the adjecti-
val comparative in (17a) involves the measure of a proposition, while the nominal
comparative in (17b) involves the measure of a state.
(17) a. ~Ann is moreδ confident that it’s raining.g =
confa(rain) > δ
9The notion of ‘content’ maps between (Davidsonian) states and propositions, as we discuss more
below. This contrasts with Hacquard 2006 proposal that the content of (say) a belief state is a set of
propositions.
10Wellwood 2014 discusses empirical and theoretical issues surrounding the handling of this com-
ponent of more’s indeterminacy.
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b. ~Ann has moreµ,δ confidence that it’s raining.g =
∃sv[holder(s,a) ∧ confidence(s) ∧ θ(s,rain) ∧ g(µ)(s) > δ]
Second, bifurcationism requires a disunified semantics for more and other de-
gree morphemes that appear both with gradable adjectives and mass nouns. When
more occurs in adjectival comparatives like (17a), it would have type 〈d,〈〈e,d〉,〈e, t〉〉,
(18a), while nominal more (at least when it occurs with properties of eventuali-
ties) would have type 〈d,〈v, t〉〉, (18b). A reasonable thought is that the bifurcation
analysis thus amounts to an ambiguity analysis, yet there is little cross-linguistic
evidence for such an ambiguity (see Bale 2006 for related discussion).
(18) a. ~moreg = λddλµed .λxe.µ(x) > d
b. ~moreµg = λddλsv .g(µ)(s) > d
Nevertheless, the question of the semantic equivalence between comparative
confidence reports based on the relevant adjectives and nouns remains. All else
being equal, an account on which the equivalence arises due to identity is to be
preferred over an account on which the equivalence is accidental. The alternative
that can do this—the assimilation analysis—would take one of two forms: either
(i) the adjectival case is assimilated to the nominal case, providing a states-based
account of gradable adjectives like confident; or (ii) the other way around.
We pursue option (i) for two reasons. The first is that assimilating the adjective
case to the nominal case allows us to leverage existing work rendering adjectival
comparatives formally on a par with nominal comparatives (see Wellwood 2015
for arguments). The second reason is that a number of standard arguments for
a davidsonian treatment of confidence replicate for confident, suggesting that both
equally well involve something non-propositional that can be measured.
We present these data next. It should be noted, though, that they are not offered
in the spirit of a refutation of option (ii); rather, we hope only to suggest that these
data provide the materials for a straightforward implementation of option (i).
Reference and quantification
First, sentences ‘about’ John’s confidence, reported using either the adjective or the
noun, introduce something that can be the antecedent for anaphors like that, (19),
and it, (20). That is, (19) means that John’s confidence in this respect surprised
Ann, and (20) means that Bill noted something both about John’s confidence, and
the effect that that confidence had on Ana. One’s confidence can also last, (21).
Importantly, such occurrences cannot be uniformly paraphrased using explicit ref-
erence to facts, propositions, or degrees.
(19) John was confident that it would snow. That surprised Ann.
(20) Bill noted John’s confidence that it would snow, and that it surprised Ann.
(21) John’s confidence lasted until he saw the clouds disperse.
Those things that can be surprising or noted must be of the sort that can fig-
ure into explicitly causal language. In (22a), the deadjectival nominalization of
confident is something of which make it snow can predicate, however falsely. This
nominalization seems equivalent to the parallel example with confidence in (22b).
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(22a) and (22b) have no licit paraphrase involving explicit reference to proposi-
tions, facts, etc.11 Importantly, such expressions can also be used to label effects,
(23a)-(23b).
(22) a. John’s being confident that it would rain made it snow.
b. John’s confidence that it would rain made it snow.
(23) a. The clouds’ appearance made John confident that it would rain.
b. The clouds’ appearance gave John confidence that it would rain.
Another argument for the presence of an eventuality argument is given by the
interaction of confidence reports with because-clauses.12 On Kawamura’s (2007)
analysis, p because q says that the q-eventuality caused the p-eventuality. Our ob-
servation is that (24a) and (24b) are equally ambiguous between two readings,
roughly paraphrased as in (25a) and (25b). If both the matrix and dependent
clauses in (24a) and (24b) introduce eventualities, then the multiple readings can
be attributed to an ambiguity in where the because-clause attaches.
(24) a. Ann is confident that Mary is in Paris because Gary is in Paris.
b. Ann has confidence that Mary is in Paris because Gary is in Paris.
(25) a. ‘Ann is confident that: Mary is in Paris because Gary is in Paris’
b. ‘Because Gary is in Paris, Ann is confident that Mary is in Paris’
These cases can be handled straightforwardly assuming that both confident and
confidence introduce a property of states. For example, take (26) as the logical form
of the two sentences in (19). By any assumption that gets the fact that he in the
discourse A man walked in. He sat down refers to the man that walked in, the state
that verifies the first logical form will value g(t) in the second. This analysis can be
extended to (20) by embedding forms like this under note.
(26) ∃sv[holder(s, j) ∧ confidence(s) ∧ θ(s,snow)]
∃sv[experiencer(s,a) ∧ surprise(s) ∧ stimulus(s,g(t))]
Along the same lines, (27) can stand equally well as the interpretation for (22a)
and (22b). Here and below, cause(x,y) is read, ‘x is the cause of y’. (27) says, then,
that there is a making of snow, and the cause of it was John’s confidence that it
would rain. Knowing what we know about weather patterns and the attitudes of
mere mortals, (27) is unlikely to ever be true.
(27) ∃ev[making(e) ∧ patient(e, snow) ∧
cause(e, ιs[confidence(s) ∧ holder(s, j) ∧ θ(s,rain)])]
Finally, the cases with because-clauses are more complex, but their treatment is
nonetheless fairly straightforward on the states-based analysis of confident and con-
fidence. When the because-clause attaches low, (28a), Ann is confident that Gary’s
11The cases in (19) and (20) are less straightforward in this respect; they certainly sound atrocious
when the referent of the pronoun is spelled out with the proposition that..., but neither sounds too
bad with the fact that.... (See Kratzer 2012 for discussion of facts as particulars.)
12We learned about this feature of because-clauses from a homework problem designed by Chris
Kennedy, who notices a similar ambiguity regarding negation.
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being in Paris is the cause of Mary’s being in Paris. When the because-clause at-
taches high, (28b), Gary’s presence in Paris causes Ann to be confident that Mary
is in Paris.
(28) a. ∃sv[confident(s) ∧ holder(s,a) ∧ θ(s) =
∃s′v[in(s′ ,p) ∧ holder(s′ , g) ∧ ∃s′′v [in(s′′ ,p) ∧ holder(s′′ ,m) ∧ cause(s′ , s′′)]]]
b. ∃s′v[in(s′ ,p) ∧ holder(s′ , g) ∧
∃sv[confidence(s) ∧ holder(s,a) ∧ cause(s′ , s) ∧ θ(s) =
∃s′′v [in(s′′ ,p) ∧ holder(s′′ ,m)]]]
This last solution exploits the neodavidsonian assumption that thematic rela-
tions like holder and our θ are exhaustive and unique—they are in fact functions.
On this assumption, the expressions, e.g., θ(s,a) and θ(s) = a are equivalent (see
discussion and references in Williams 2015). This assumption implies that any
confidence state has a unique holder (that named in the subject position of the lo-
cal clause), and a unique theme (that named in the syntactic complement of the A
or N introducing the states).
We retain this assumption in what follows.
3 The semantics of confidence reports
Basics: the positive form
As anticipated, we mostly build on the neodavidsonian semantics for gradable ad-
jectives in Wellwood (2014, 2015), on which they express properties of ordered
states. Novel to our implementation is a certain characterization of the interpreta-
tion of the positive and comparative forms. To foreshadow the general approach,
independent of the specifics of confidence reports, we draw a basic distinction be-
tween states of height and states of tallness (i.e., the potential satisfiers of the pred-
icate tallness). Every state of tallness is a state of height but not vice versa; positive
occurrences of tall apply to height states in the ‘positive region’ of this ordered set,
and forms like taller apply to any state of height.
We illustrate these details using tall, where the presentation will be more intu-
itive, and then return to our discussion of confidence reports. Following Wellwood,
computing the interpretation of a simple sentence like (29) involves interpreting
tall as a property of states, as in (30a), with the resulting logical form for (29) in
(30b), according to the usual neodavidsonian assumptions.
(29) Mary is tall.
(30) a. ~tallg = λsv .tallness(s)
b. ∃sv[holder(s,m)∧ tallness(s)]
In our proposal, the domains of gradable adjectives consist of elements in the
domain of an ordering on states. Formally, this ordering is modeled as a pair 〈D,%〉
of a set of states and (at least) a total pre-order on those states. For concreteness,
assume that this ordering is tracked via a presupposition on the domain of the
function expressed by the adjective, (31). (The subscript ‘height’ flags that the
relevant states are states of height—more on this momentarily.)
(31) ~tallg = λsv : s ∈Dom(〈Dheight,%〉).tallness(s)
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Crucially, we make a distinction between ‘height states’ and ‘tallness states’.
So for example, the tallest individuals in a context will instantiate states of height
and tallness, while the shortest individuals will instantiate height but not tallness
states. Thus, the meaning of tall isolates which of the height states count as tallness
states. Going forward, we will call the broad domain that the adjective invokes
the background ordering, and the set of states that an adjective like tall is true of
the positive region of that ordering.13 The relationship between the background
ordering and the positive region can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A pre-order on height states, some of which are tallness states.
height ordering︷                                                                          ︸︸                                                                          ︷
. . . s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 . . .︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
positive region (states that count as tall)
Under this approach, the well-known context-dependence of gradable adjec-
tives is reflected in how the positive region of the background ordering is deter-
mined. As a reminder, the central datum here is that a sentence like Ann is tall
is true just in case Ann exceeds some standard for tallness in the context. We
implement this context-sensitivity in the states-based framework making use of a
contextual index on the gradable adjective. To delimit the positive region of the or-
dering, we explicitly define the positive region in terms of a function that we label
contrast. As we show below, this implementation is useful for capturing patterns
of judgment that are particular to confidence reports, as well as for capturing the
logic of those reports.
Concretely, we assume the lexical entry for tall in (32a), with the predicate
tallness indexed by C. In general, the truth-conditional effect of this is given in
(32b), for any gradable property, g-ness, associated background ordering %g-ness,
and state s. The function contrast maps the target state s to a salient contrast state
s′. In the case of (29), we now have the logical form in (33), which says that (29) is
true just in case Mary is in a height state s ordered at least as high as the contrast
state s′ in that ordering.14
(32) a. ~tallg = λsv : s ∈Dom(〈Dheight,%〉).tallnessC(s)
b. g-nessC(s) is true iff s %g-ness contrastC(g-ness)(s)
(33) ∃sv[holder(s,m)∧ tallnessC(s)]
≡ ∃sv[holder(s,m)∧ s %height contrastC(tallness)(s)]
This proposal is interesting for a number of reasons. First, our account of the
positive form doesn’t invoke measures, unlike those that utilize pos. Furthermore,
we can already see how relativizing the contrast function to the gradable property
can be useful: it allows different cut-off points for different adjectives, even if they
13Our terminology is meant to overlap with that of vagueness-based approaches like that of Klein
1980, 1982. Such approaches also posit an ordering on the domain of the adjective, though this is
between individuals.
14We have given tallness, unrelativized by C, to the contrast with g-ness because, as we will see,
different properties that invoke the same background ordering nonetheless have different ‘cutoff’
points.
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plausibly share the same background ordering. Thus, we have in place a natural
framework for modeling the relationships among clusters of gradable adjectives,
like cool ∼ warm ∼ hot, or doubtful ∼ unsure ∼ sure. The further left in these
lists, the lower the cut-off point required for a heat or credence state to count as an
instance of the property.
Basics: the comparative form
Interpreting gradable adjectives as measure functions (or relations between indi-
viduals and degrees) generally leads to the problem of how to ‘discharge’ their
degree-relativity when there is no degree morphology. In the standard scalar set-
ting, pos is posited to do this work: it relates the subject’s degree of g-ness to
a standard of g-ness in the context. This meaning contribution is usually made
separately from the adjective in order to avoid unwanted inferences in the com-
parative form. Our proposal also separates these meaning contributions, but it
takes a different approach. Instead of postulating additional covert material in
the positive form, we propose that comparative morphology discards the contex-
tual information encoded in the contrast function—thus allowing us to access the
entire background ordering.
For an instance of the kind of issue that pos and background orderings are
meant to solve, consider the sentence in (34). This does not entail that Mary ex-
ceeds any standard for tallness. If the lexical meaning of tall invoked such stan-
dards, and if that lexical item is transparently involved in the calculation of (34),
this observation would be unexpected. Our approach dispenses with standard-
relativity by supposing that the comparative morpheme (-er or more) takes the
gradable expression as an argument, and uses it only to extract information about
the background ordering from it—there is no claim that the context-sensitive prop-
erty holds of the subject.
(34) Mary is taller than Sue.
This approach also dovetails well with the observation that even entities with
very little height can be compared using taller than. By way of illustration we
add a useful piece of notation. We assume a function background( · ) that maps
states to a background ordering on which those states are located. For example,
background( · ) maps states of tallness to a background ordering of states of height,
which includes also states of height that don’t qualify as tall.
For ease of exposition, it’s convenient to be abuse notation and allow the func-
tion background( · ) to apply to individual states, sets of states, and characteristic
functions of the latter. In all these cases, it returns the background ordering on
which the relevant states lie. This allows us to use the denotations of adjectives
like tall directly as the argument of background( · ).
In the entry for more in (35), background is invoked in a presupposition on the
state argument: the relevant state is presupposed to be part of the background or-
dering. Thus, -er/more combines with a degree (the denotation of the than-clause),
and a property of states G (in the present cases) to return a property of states that
are in background(G).
(35) ~moreµg = λddλGvtλsv : s ∈ background(G).g(µ)(s) > d
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In (35), g(µ) is a contextual assignment of values to a variable over measure
function types, here 〈v,d〉. The selection of these values must meet one further
condition which guarantees that the (strict) ordering relations on the measured
domain are preserved in the corresponding degree ordering. On the assumption
that background(G)(s) is only defined if there is a background ordering, 〈D,%〉,
such that s is in D, the condition may be stated as in (36) (cf. Schwarzschild 2006,
Nakanishi 2007, and Wellwood 2014, 2015). This says that if any two states are
strictly ordered in a certain way in the background ordering, then their µ-measures
are ordered in the same way in the degree ordering.
(36) ∀s, s′ ∈Dom(〈D,%〉), if s  s′, then g(µ)(s) > g(µ)(s′).
For illustration, the compositional process underlying (34) is sketched in (37).
Abbreviating the contribution of the than-clause using δ, the property expressed
by the degree phrase, taller than Sue, is a property of states in the background
ordering of tallnessC whose g(µ)-measure is greater than δ, (37c). Combining the
rest, (34) is interpreted as in (38), which says that Mary is in a height state (i.e., a
state in the domain of the background ordering for tallnessC), the g(µ) measure of
which is greater than that of a corresponding state of Sue.15
(37) a. ~than Sueg = δ
b. ~er [than Sue]g = λG〈vt〉.λsv : s ∈ background(G).g(µ)(s) > δ
c. ~[tall [er than Sue]g = λsv : s ∈ background(tallnessC). g(µ)(s) > δ
(38) ~(34)g = ∃sv : s ∈ background(tallnessC) [holder(s,m) ∧ g(µ)(s) > δ]
The general idea is that the function expressed by tall have a structured domain
(of states), and the structure of that domain must be preserved in the mapping to
degrees by the comparative operator. The details might look complicated, but they
just extend how nominal comparatives work in simpler cases. For instance, the
analysis of more coffee assumes that (i) coffee expresses a function whose domain is
ordered by a part-of relation on portions of coffee, and (ii) permissible values of
µ in the comparative (e.g., a volume or weight measure) respect strict part-whole
relations on those portions.
Comparative confidence reports
Next, we extend these ideas to confident and confidence. Assume that the schematic
comparative sentences in (39) have the same interpretation, i.e. (40). Both express
an existential statement about confidence states whose holder is Ann, whose theme
is (so we are supposing) the proposition p, and whose measure µ is greater than δ
(the value provided by the than-clause, implicit in (39)). This analysis assumes
that confident and confidence apply to the same subset of the same background
ordering, though we revisit this assumption in the next section.
(39) a. A is more confident that p.
b. A has more confidence that p.
15We have indicated the restriction to the background ordering on height states as a restriction on
the domain of the existential quantifier in (38).
12
(40) ∃sv : s ∈ background(confidenceC) [holder(s,a) ∧ θ(s,p) ∧ g(µ)(s) > δ]
The relevant background ordering ranks states by how confident a holder a is
in the truth of the state’s theme. Thus, the background ordering includes states of
high as well as low confidence. Both confident and confidence single out a positive
region of this ordering that includes the upper bound. The ordering is tracked, as
before, via presupposition, as shown in (41). Here, the superscript h(s) abbrevi-
ates holder(s) and the subscript conf indicates that the ordering concerns states of
confidence.16
(41) ~confidentg = ~confidenceg =
λsv : s ∈Dom(〈Dh(s)conf,%〉).confidenceC(s)
In the end, logical forms like (40) say just that A’s confidence with respect to p is
greater than δ. This is a roundabout way of saying what the standard scalar analysis
can say much more directly. However, taking the detour through states makes it
explicit that it is confidence (and not the proposition that the confidence relates to)
that is measured. It also allows us to capture the intuitive equivalence between the
nominal and adjectival comparative forms as a matter of (propositional) identity,
all the while maintaining a univocal analysis of more.
Even though we state the lexical semantics in terms of an ordering of states, it is
occasionally more intuitive to think of confidence orderings as orderings of propo-
sitions. Since we assume that thematic relations functionally connect states with
propositions, we can reserve for ourselves the ability to speak both ways—in terms
of the basic orderings of states, and in terms of the orderings of the propositions
that are the themes of those states.
Positive confidence reports
The machinery that we established for the interpretation of the positive form with
tallness or for g-ness in general extends straightforwardly to the case of confident
and confidence as well. Assume, as before, that the schematic positive sentences in
(42) have the same interpretation—i.e., (43). Both express an existential statement
about confidence states s whose holder is Ann, whose theme is the proposition p,
and which is ordered higher than its contrast state s′ according to the background
ordering on confidence states.
(42) a. A is confident that p.
b. A has confidence that p.
(43) ∃sv[holder(s,a)∧ confidenceC(s)]
≡ ∃sv[holder(s,a)∧ s %h(s)conf contrastC(confidence)(s)]
The fact that this analysis predicts that (42a) and (42b) have equivalent truth-
conditions might look surprising. Suppose for instance that the weatherman is
20% confident that it will rain. In such a context, there is little temptation to
accept the weatherman is confident that it will rain. Some judge, however, that the
16Relativizing the confidence structure to a holder is one of the main differences between the
interpretations we assign to confident (/confidence) and likely, as we show below.
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weatherman has confidence that it will rain is acceptable here. Indeed, the latter
sentence seems to suggest that the weatherman has some confidence that it will
rain. Taken at face value, such judgments are in tension with our prediction that
sentences with confident and confidence are equivalent.
Nonetheless, we think that there are good reasons not to take these judgments
at face value. For one thing, if having confidence means the same as having some
confidence, then negating a sentence of the form A has confidence that p should re-
quire that A has no confidence whatsoever in p. But this doesn’t seem right. For
example, (44) doesn’t require that the weatherman assign zero confidence to the
possibility of rain in order to be judged true.
(44) The weatherman does not have confidence that it will rain.
Another reason to reject any identification between having confidence and having
some confidence is that it would predict Ann has more confidence that it’s raining than
that it’s snowing to entail Ann has confidence that it’s raining. This seems wrong, too:
merely having more confidence in p than in q doesn’t seem sufficient for having
confidence in p.
Perhaps, however, one might reject the equivalence between (42a) and (42b)
while denying that A has confidence that p is equivalent to A has some confidence that
p. Nominal confidence reports might demand a lower (but non-zero) threshold
than adjectival reports. Officially, we are agnostic on this point, but it is worth
noting that our framework allows us to model it as a possibility. For instance, we
might treat confident and confidence on the model of hot and warm—i.e., that there
are two different properties of states, confident and confidence. They are based on
the same background confidence ordering, just the contrast function maps them
to different benchmarks on that ordering in the positive form.
The logic of confidence reports
The analysis we propose has interesting consequences for the logic of reports with
confident and confidence.
On the one hand, we impose virtually no constraints on what a subject’s confi-
dence ordering looks like. This allows us to regard as true any confidence report
that describes states that cannot be represented via a probability function. Here
is one example: by the way probability functions are defined, the probability of
a conjunction is a lower bound on the probability of a conjunct. Yet it is well-
known17 that, under determinate circumstances, subjects appear to routinely vio-
late this constraint. As a result, it appears that, under the right circumstances, the
sentences in (45) can be true together.
(45) a. John is not confident that Linda is a bankteller.
b. John is confident that Linda is a feminist bankteller.
Our semantics is perfectly equipped to vindicate this. Similarly, nothing in our
proposal dictates that a subject should be fully confident of tautologies; at the same
time, probability functions assign tautologies full probability by design.
17The locus classicus for this claim is Tversky and Kahneman 1983.
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On the other hand, some other predictions are hardwired in our semantics.
These predictions don’t track logical relations between the contents of confidence
states. Rather, they track logical relations between confidence states themselves. For
example, the inference from (46a) to (46b) is validated by our semantics.
(46) a. S is confident that p, S is more confident of q than of p
b. S is confident that q
Below is an (incomplete) list of logical properties of our semantics for confident
and confidence.
Transitivity. (47a) and (47b) entail (47c).
(47) a. S is more confident (/has more confidence) that p than that q.
b. S is more confident (/has more confidence) that q than that r.
c. S is more confident (/has more confidence) that p than that r.
Antisymmetry. (48a) and (48b) entail (48c).
(48) a. S is at least as confident of p as of q.
b. S is at least as confident of q as of p.
c. S is equally confident of p and q.
Connectedness. (49) is a logical truth.
(49) Either S is at least as confident of p as of q, or S is at least as confident of q
as of p.
Let us emphasize that the reason why we choose to encode these properties in
the logic of confident/confidence is empirical. These properties seem to be encoded
in the grammar of the relevant words. We pointed out that the sentences in (45)
seem perfectly consistent, though of course they describe a subject whose cogni-
tive state is not fully rational. Conversely, violations of transitivity, antisymmetry,
and connectedness strike us as problematic from a grammatical point of view. For
example, the discourse in (50) appears to be contradictory.
(50) Aidan is more confident that it will rain than that it will snow, and more
confident that it will be windy than that it will rain. # But he’s not more
confident that it will be windy than that it will snow.
Any plausible semantics for pos and the comparative will vindicate the entail-
ment in (46). Conversely, the pattern in (51) requires more controversial assump-
tions. If we continue to suppose that the contrast functions invoked by pos always
map a proposition to its negation (a corollary of which is that one cannot be both
confident that p and confident that ¬p), then we predict the entailment in (51):
(51a) would require confidence-that-p states are ranked higher than confidence-
that-not-p states in the state structure, and more will always map higher-ranked
states to higher degrees, in line with its monotonicity condition.
(51) a. S is confident (/has confidence) that p.
b. S is more confident (/has more confidence) that p than that ¬p.
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These seem welcome consequences of assuming that the contrast of a proposi-
tion is always is negation. Nevertheless, we prefer to remain agnostic about this
assumption, since there are also substantial reasons to doubt it. Here are two.
First, the assumption might overgenerate. We did not assume that an attitude
holder’s confidence states are probabilistic, hence it may happen that Carlo has
extremely low confidence in p and even lower confidence in ¬p. In this case, if we
hold on to the assumption that the contrast of a proposition is always its negation,
Carlo will still count as confident in p. But this seems wrong.18
Second, there seem to be intuitive cases where an agent is confident in a propo-
sition, even though they are more confident of its negation.19 Suppose that Clara,
who is probabilistically coherent, believes that the Warriors have a 49% chance of
winning the NBA finals this year, and that each of the other teams has at most a
3% chance of winning. Now suppose that we are having a discussion about which
teams have the best shot at winning the finals. (52) seems true in this context,
despite the mass of Clara’s confidence favoring some team other than the Warriors.
(52) Clara is confident that the Warriors will win the NBA finals.
Conditional confidence
To conclude our discussion of confidence reports, we quickly touch on one last
complication. Confidence reports interact with conditional antecedents in ways
that are not entirely predicted by the system we have set up. Two specific kinds
of facts stand out: it is possible for one to self-ascribe conditional confidence in A
even if one is not confident of A, as in (53a). Such conditional ascriptions sound
roughly equivalent to self-ascriptions of confidence in the conditional, as in (53b).
(53) a. If Lisa is in town, I am confident that she is at the lab.
b. I am confident that if Lisa is in town she is at the coffee lab.
A first stab at this kind of account is to make the background ordering sensitive
to an information state i which can be operated on by conditional antecedents.
Specifically, revise (41) to (54)—indexing the ordering % with i. Then, assume a
semantics for conditional (in the style of Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010) in which
conditional antecedents restrict i. Since (54) make the ordering % dependent on i,
this predicts that one can assert (53a) even if one isn’t unconditionally confident
that Lisa is at the lab.
(54) ~confidentg = ~confidenceg = λsv : s ∈Dom(〈Dh(s)conf,%i〉).confidentC(s)
18We might try to fix this by letting the contrast proposition be some benchmark propositions
(e.g. a proposition that the agent feels fifty-fifty about p and q). This would fix the current problem
and it will make the same predictions as the original proposal when the attitude holder’s confidence
structure is probabilistic. But it loses the entailment (51) and its corollary, as there might be some
non-probabilistic attitude holders according to which both p and ¬p exceed the benchmark. Ulti-
mately, we should expect some unintuitive predictions from any theory that attempts to model less
than perfectly coherent agents. It is hard to say, when an agent’s confidence structure is incoherent
in the way Carlo’s is, what exactly the semantics should predict.
19For a similar point about likely, cf. Yalcin 2010 and the discussion in Hawthorne et al. 2016, p.
1400.
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4 Probability operators in a states-based framework
Beyond confidence
Confidence reports belong to a category which we roughly characterized as grad-
able attitude reports. We can think of such gradable attitude reports as claims
about some attitude holder’s being in a certain credal state. This naturally raises
the question of how the work we carried out in the case of gradable attitude re-
ports relates to the recent explosion of work on gradable epistemic modality. For
instance, much recent work has tackled the semantic analysis of claims such as
those in (55).20
(55) a. It is likely to rain.
b. It is more likely to rain than to snow.
The first thing to observe here is that there are important asymmetries be-
tween the semantics of gradable attitude reports and the semantics of probabilistic
modals like likely. These asymmetries have already been used to draw a contrast
between believe, on the one hand, and might/must, on the other. They can be easily
replicated for confident and likely.
For example, consider the contrast in (56), where (56a) is clearly consistently
acceptable while (56b) sounds like a contradiction (Yalcin 2007).
(56) a. Suppose it’s raining but I believe it is not raining.
b. # Suppose it’s raining but it might not be raining.
The same contrast shows up with the pairs in (57) and (58) that involve our target
expressions.
(57) a. Suppose it’s raining but I am confident it is not raining.
b. # Suppose it’s raining but it is probably not raining.
(58) a. Suppose it’s raining but I am more confident that it’s snowing than
that it’s raining.
b. # Suppose it’s raining but it’s more likely that it’s snowing than that it’s
raining.
These considerations caution us against assuming that we can just extend our
lexical entry for confident to probability operators. Probability operators are im-
portantly different from attitude verbs.
At the same time, there are important reasons to explore a states-based analysis
of probabilistic language. For one thing, there appears to be a near equivalence be-
tween gradable confidence reports and qualitative belief ascriptions involving cer-
tain probabilistic contents. For instance, there is a reading of confident that makes
the sentences in (59) sound roughly equivalent, and similarly for the sentences in
(60).21
20For a non-exhaustive list, see Yalcin 2010; Swanson 2007; Lassiter 2011, 2015, 2016; Holliday
and Icard 2013; Klecha 2014; Moss 2015, 2018; Santorio and Romoli 2017. For an approach to
gradable modality that may have implications for gradable epistemic modals (even though it was
not initially developed in that context) see Portner and Rubinstein 2016.
21We do not, of course, deny that there is another reading of (59a) on which this equivalence fails.
Given this other reading, "I am confident that p" means roughly that I have faith that p will happen.
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(59) a. I am confident (/have confidence) that it will rain.
b. I believe it is likely that it will rain.
(60) a. I am more confident that Masaya will teach syntax than that he will
teach semantics.
b. I believe that it is more likely Masaya will teach syntax than that he will
teach semantics.
We talk about ‘rough equivalence’ here because we encountered a variety of judg-
ments on the matter. While some people judge them to be equivalent, others hear
(59a) as somewhat stronger than (59b). This intuition is supported by the observa-
tion that (61) can be heard as consistent.
(61) I think it’s likely that it will rain, though I’m not confident that it will rain.
We are going to return to this point. For now, let us observe that such worries are
generally targeted to the positive form—sentences in (59). The intuitions in favor
of equivalence are much stronger with the comparative sentences in (60). Those
are all we need to support our point that we need to make sense of an inferential
link between gradable attitude expressions and probability operators.
There are additional, more direct considerations for extending the states-based
approach to probability operators. The most important one is that, as for confi-
dence reports, related probability claims can be expressed using nominal forms,
for example (62).
(62) a. There is a chance I will drink tea today.
b. There is more chance/likelihood that it will rain than that it will snow.
c. There is a good chance/probability of snow above 5000 ft.
The distributional facts that inspired the states-based approach to confidence
replicate in this case too. Nouns like chance, probability and likelihood combine
comfortably with much, but not with cardinal number words (?two chances, ?two
likelihoods), or distributive quantifiers (?each chance, ?each likelihood), etc.22
Moreover, the array of data that suggested the presence of an event argument
in confidence reports can be replicated for likelihood claims. First of all, these
nominal forms can introduce causes, (63), and effects, (64). This suggests that, as
for confidence reports, that the sentences in (63) and (64) involve concrete entities
linked to likelihood that can enter into causal relations.
(63) a. The likelihood of snow led me to wear boots.
b. The probability of snow led me to wear boots.
c. Rain’s being likely caused me to bring an umbrella.
(64) a. God banging his drum increased the likelihood of snow.
b. Warm air currents lessened the probability of snow.
c. God’s banging his drum made snow likely.
22One potential counter-example is, the chances of winning are low. But this seems to be an isolated
property of chance rather than a general feature of nominal probability operators.
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Finally, again like confidence reports, likelihood reports show the type of ambi-
guity with because-clauses that we reported for confident/confidence. In particular,
(65) is ambiguous between the two readings paraphrased in (65a) and (65b). If
likely introduces a Davidsonian argument, then this ambiguity can similarly be
seen to reduce to an ambiguity in the attachment site for the because-clause.
(65) It’s likely (/there is some likelihood) that Mary is in Paris because Sue is in
Paris.
a. ‘It’s likely (/there is some likelihood) that: Mary is in Paris because Sue
is in Paris’
b. ‘It’s likely (/there is some likelihood) that Mary is in Paris, given that:
Sue is in Paris’
Taking stock, these considerations support the project of devising a states-
based semantics for probability operators. Furthermore, the apparent equivalence
between gradable confidence reports and qualitative belief ascriptions involving
probabilistic contents suggests development within a single, unified framework.
We have to be careful not to push the connections too far, though: we must also
be able to capture the difference between confidence reports and claims involving
probability operators, e.g., the differences under suppose observed in (57)-(58).
Qualitative probability: A primer
At the heart of the framework we developed for confidence reports was a simple
design principle. Degrees (e.g. representing confidence) are only recruited com-
positionally by degree expressions like more. But they are absent from the positive
forms, both adjectival and nominal. In developing the semantics for confidence
reports, we just assumed some background ordering of states of confidence— or-
derings satisfying some very minimal conditions.
We will follow the same design principle when it comes to the semantics for
probability operators. First, there is an important difference between the two cases.
To ensure that our probability operators have enough of their standard logic, as-
sume that the background ordering has a distinctive structure. In particular, as-
sume that probability operators are evaluated against the background of a qualita-
tive probability structure, which we represent as an index coordinate.
A finite qualitative probability structure Q = 〈W,%〉 is a pair where W is a
finite set of points–e.g. worlds, and % is an ordering on the elements of W by
their comparative probability. (We focus on the finite case solely for reasons of
simplicity of exposition.) Let > denote the set containing every world in W and
⊥ be the empty set. With these conventions, let % be a total pre-order over the
members of P (W ) satisfying three further conditions:
1. non-triviality: > >⊥;
2. non-negativity: ∀A ∈ P (W ), A %⊥;
3. qualitative additivity: if (A∩B) = (A∩C) = ∅, then (B % C) iff (A∪B) % (A∪C).








In the particular case of this structure, we can reverse engineer a unique probability
function P that represents the structure in the sense that for any A,B, A  B iff
P (A) > P (B). Specifically, we can reason that P (A∧ B) = 1/2, since this conjunction
is equiprobable with its negation. Furthermore, since this means P (¬A∨¬B) and
all of A∧¬B,¬A∧B,¬A∧¬B are equiprobable, we can infer that the probability of
each of those atoms is 1/6. These facts are sufficient to fully identify P .
In the general case, however, qualitative probability structures carry strictly
less information than individual probability functions. In the first instance, the
axioms do not guarantee that for every qualitative probability structure, there is
a probability measure that represents it (Kraft et al., 1959). That is, they do not
guarantee that there is a probability function P ′ such that for every A, B, A % B iff
P ′(A) ≥ P ′(B). Furthermore, when there are probability functions that represent
these orderings there generally are multiple such functions.
The first of these failures is of direct significance for our account. We have
argued that numerical measures, though absent from the positive form, can be
compositionally introduced by degree morphemes. The failure of representabil-
ity teaches us that sometimes the measure functions that are compositionally in-
troduced are not probability functions, but measures of a more general sort. In
particular, we can say that for every qualitative probability structure Q, there is a
function m that represents Q in the sense above. We can choose this function so as
to have additional properties, for example that m(>) = 1 and m(⊥) = 0. We cannot,
as noted, require it to be additive.23 But we can require it to satisfy a principle
corresponding to qualitative additivity (Holliday and Icard, 2013, §7), namely:
(66) if µ(A) ≥ µ(B)⇔ µ(A−B) ≥ µ(B−A)
However, while in general there is no guarantee that the representing function
will be a probability function, the failures of representability are rather isolated.
What we mean by this is that we can safely assume that in virtually all ordinary
discourse, the relevant qualitative probability orderings are of the representable
kind (see the related discussion in §10.1 of Holliday and Icard 2013). That is to say
23In the strict mathematical sense of ‘measure’, this means that m is not a measure–for additivity
is part of what it is to be a measure. However, in the theory of gradable adjectives ‘measure’ is used
to pick out functions that map their inputs to degrees, which m obviously does.
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then that the idea that probabilistic discourse involves probability measures can
stand empirically, as a generealization about virtually all discourse, even if it is not
guaranteed conceptually.
States-based semantics for probability operators
For the purpose of sketching out a semantics of probability words, we assume that
likely and probable are perfect synonyms, and similarly for likelihood and probability.
For brevity, we focus on the adjective likely and on the noun likelihood.
At a structural level, our analysis of likely and related items mirrors our treat-
ment of confident. Claims involving likely in the positive form, like (67a), are an-
alyzed as stating the existence of a probability state whose theme is the prejacent,
the proposition snow. Claims involving likely in the comparative, like (68a), are
analyzed as stating the existence of such a state and claiming that its measure is
greater than δ, here understood as in (69).
(67) a. It is likely that it will snow.
b. ∃sv[θ(s,snow) ∧ probability(s) ∧ pos(s)]
(68) a. It is more likely that it will snow than that it will rain.
b. ∃sv[θ(s,snow) ∧ probability(s) ∧ g(µ)(s) > δ]
(69) max(λd.∃sv[θ(s,rain) ∧ probability(s) ∧ g(µ)(s) ≥ d])
At the lexical level, we assume that both likely and likelihood denote properties
of states. The difference is that, unlike with confident and confidence, we assume the
background structure against which we evaluate them to be probabilistic. In par-
ticular, we assume it to be a qualitative probability structure 〈W,%〉, represented
as an element in the index of evaluation. Our lexical entries for likely/likelihood are
as in (82).
(70) ~likely〈W,%〉,g = ~likelihood〈W,%〉,g
= λsv : θ(s) ∈Dom(〈W,%〉).probability(s)
These entries result very roughly in the following truth-conditions. (67a) says
that there is a state of probability whose theme is the proposition that it snows,
snow, such that snow is ranked higher by the background probability structure
than the contrast proposition. If we continue operating under the assumption that
the contrast proposition to p is ¬p, the proposal will generally mirror scalar theo-
ries that settle the probability threshold for the truth of likely p at 0.5. Meanwhile,
(68a) is true if there is a state of probability whose theme exceeds δ, according to
the relevant measure (i.e., the maximum degree to which there is a state of proba-
bility whose theme is rain).
Remarks on the theory
The theory we just sketched is non-committal on how the relevant qualitative prob-
ability (henceforth, QP) structure is fixed. In particular, it is compatible with a
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variety of positions that have been defended in the debate about epistemic modal-
ity.24 Contextualists maintain that the value of the QP structure parameter is fixed
(or, in the terminology of MacFarlane (2014), ‘initialized’) by the context of utter-
ance. Relativists maintain that it is fixed by a second context, i.e. the context in
which an utterance is assessed for truth or falsity. Finally, expressivists claim that
the value of the QP parameter is not fixed by a context at all. Rather, sentences
involving likely are assigned contents that directly carve a space of QP structures.
Our setup is entirely neutral between these assumptions.25
Moving on to a different issue, the theory we just sketched steers an interesting
middle course in an important recent debate on the semantics of the language of
subjective uncertainty. The question that sparks this debate is whether we should
invoke the resource of the mathematical theory of probability when theorizing
about probabilistic language. The affirmative answer is typically (though not uni-
versally) endorsed by scalar theorists. The negative answer tends to focus on the
idea that it is implausible that the language faculty might resort to something as
complex as that. Instead, it is generally proposed that the semantics of probabil-
ity operators be seen as emerging from qualitative comparisons between worlds
(Kratzer, 2012; Holliday and Icard, 2013) These comparisons are then ‘lifted’ to
comparisons of probability among propositions. Consequently, some scalar theo-
rists (Lassiter, 2015, see, e.g. the discussion) take qualitative theorists to task for
lacking the resources to model claims like it is 35% likely that it will rain. Qualita-
tive theorists on the other hand, question whether we need the extremely powerful
resources of mathematical probability to model anything except for a few isolated
domains of mathematical discourse.
Our approach differs substantially from all of these: unlike the qualitative the-
orists, we believe that measures are involved when there are explicit degree mor-
phemes. Concretely, the truth-conditions of it is 35% likely that ... may well involve
a measure function. However, we agree with the qualitative theorists that qualita-
tive probability is just fine for any contexts that do not involve degree-introducing
words. Finally, we are not motivated to build our qualitative probability structure
out of orderings of worlds. It is acceptable to us to start directly with an ordering
of propositions (in other words, we advance a version of what Holliday and Icard
(2013) call ’event-ordering semantics’).
QP structures differ from confidence structures in that their are subject to fur-
ther constraints. Earlier on we highlighted that we assumed little about the struc-
ture of confidence relations. Not so for probability operators. The requirement that
likely and likelihood have to be interpreted relative to a QP structure imposes tighter
constraints. Keeping context fixed, the claims in (71) cannot be true together (since
qualitative probability satisfies a form of additivity, hence the probability of A&B
works as a lower bound on the probability of A).
(71) a. It’s not likely that Linda is a bankteller.
b. It’s likely that Linda is a feminist bankteller.
24For some representative papers in this debate, see, among many: DeRose 1991 for the contex-
tualist position; MacFarlane 2009, 2014 for the relativist position; and Yalcin 2007, 2011 for the
expressivist position. See also Weatherson and Egan 2011 for a helpful introduction to the debate.
25This said, for concreteness it’s easier to assume one of these accounts in the background, so
sometimes we speak as if the value of the QP is fixed by the context of utterance.
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More generally, our semantics vindicates the entire inferential gauntlet laid
down by Yalcin (2010). In the Appendix to the paper we have listed all the valid
and invalid entailments discussed by Yalcin (the validites are listed in the format
Vn, with n a number; the invalidities are listed as In). The central claim, which
we merely flash here and defend more fully in the Appendix, is that all of Yalcin’s
validities are valid and all of Yalcin’s invalidities are invalid in our system.
Supporting these claims depends, of course, on a definition of entailment. We
define entailment as preservation of truth at context-initialized indices. We com-
plete this definition by assuming that, given a language L, for each qualitative
probability structure Q (based on L) and admissible assignment function g (suit-
able for L), 〈Q,g〉 is an eligible index—and thus within the scope of the definition
of entailment.
As we anticipated in our discussion of confidence reports, we can get extra
empirical coverage by relaxing our approach to the contrast function. In its more
general form, this function inputs a state s with theme p and outputs a set of states
{s1, ..., sn} whose themes are the contrast propositions to p. This allows us to verify
the truth of utterances like It is likely that the Warriors will win the NBA title even
against probability structures in which this prejacent proposition has probability
below 50%. We can model this sort of example by assuming that the contrasts
of the Warriors will win the NBA title are the propositions corresponding to each
individual alternative team winning.
This change does have the effect of significantly weakening the logic. Many
inferences that are valid under the simpler conception of the contrast function
become invalid once we generalize the framework in this way. The simplest such
inference is the one with premise Rain is likely and conclusion Rain is more likely
than no rain.
5 Vindicating the motivating equivalence
Introducing semantics for belief
Part of our motivation for a states-based analysis of probability operators was the
desire to capture the near-equivalences between the reports in (72) and (73) (re-
peated from above). We first show how our semantics can treat the pairs in ques-
tion as fully equivalent, and then introduce some hedging for the positive case.
(72) a. I am confident (/have confidence) that it will rain.
b. I believe it is likely that it will rain.
(73) a. I am more confident that Masaya will teach syntax than that he will
teach semantics.
b. I believe that it is more likely Masaya will teach syntax than that he will
teach semantics.
Any account of these examples must start from an account of belief states. Here
we follow the general recipe we have been following and treat attitude verbs like
believe as expressing properties of states.26 In particular, the LF corresponding to
(72b) is in (74).
26See Kratzer 2006 for pioneering work in this theoretical direction.
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(74) ∃sv[holder(i, s) ∧ belief(s) ∧ θ(s, likely(rain))]
In addition, to validate the equivalences above, we postulate that there is a kind
of semantic interaction between believe and likely. In particular, when appearing in
a belief report, likely will not operate on a qualitative probability ordering. Rather,
it will operate directly on the confidence state of the subject. This kind of inter-
action is familiar from recent work on epistemic modality (see e.g. Yalcin 2007,
Stephenson 2007), but it needs to be adapted to our neodavidsonian framework.
To this end, we make three related nonstandard assumptions.
First, we adopt a somewhat complex model of belief states. In particular, we
assume that every belief state is also a confidence state. As a result, having a belief
state involves (among other things) having a confidence ranking on propositions.
The assumption is motivated by the idea that one cannot believe that it’s raining
without being confident that it’s raining. In further support of the assumption, we
note some natural language judgments: Lara believes that p but she isn’t confident
that p sounds contradictory. This suggests (though, of course, doesn’t entail) that
being in a belief state with content p involves being confident of p.
Our second assumption dovetails with our picture of belief states. On a simple
view, the theme of a belief state is just a proposition. We suggest instead that
the theme of a belief state is a more complex object, which we can think of as a
function from pairs of a 〈D,%〉-structure and a world to truth-values. Using ‘S’ for
the semantic type of 〈D,%〉-structures, we say that the type of themes of confidence
structures is 〈〈S,s〉, t〉).
For illustration, let’s consider a couple of concrete examples. (75b) and (76b)
are the themes contributed by a simple declarative sentence, (75a), and a sentence
involving likely, (76a). Both (75b) and (76b) contribute higher-type functions than
simple propositions: specifically, they contribute functions from 〈D,%〉 and worlds
to truth values. But this uniformity holds merely for technical reasons. In (75b),
the ordering parameter is idle and doesn’t bind any variables. Conversely for (76b),
where the world parameter is idle.
(75) a. It’s raining.
b. λ〈D,%〉. λw. ∃sv : rain(s) at w
(76) a. It’s likely that it’s raining.
b. λ〈D,%〉. λw. ∃sv : θ(s) ∈Dom(〈D,%〉). [likelihood(s) ∧ θ(s,rain) ∧
contrastC(likelihood)(s)  s′ ]]
Nothing in (76b) settles whether the relevant structure is a QP-structure or a
confidence structure. (76b) merely imposes a constraint on a 〈D,%〉-structure. This
connects to our third and last assumption. We assume that the theme relation for
the case of attitude verbs should be understood in the following way. For a state to
have a certain content as theme is for that content to be true at the 〈D,%〉 structure
and all the worlds compatible with the content of that the state determined by that
state. To state this formally, we define an auxiliary function: cstructure inputs an
individual and outputs the confidence structure 〈D,%〉 of that individual.
(77) ∀s : s is a belief state. θ(s,P ) iff ∀w′ compatible with the beliefs of holder(s),
P (cstructure(s),w′) = 1
Informally, (77) can be glossed as:
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(78) For any belief state s: a content P is theme of s (θ(s,p)) iff p is true at the
confidence structure of the holder and the world of the state.
This completes our exposition of the semantics for belief. Next, we briefly discuss
some of its consequences. However, the details are pretty involved and since some
readers may be unfamiliar with the neodavidsonian system we have been using, in
the following section we will restate the basic ideas in an event semantics frame-
work with more familiar notation.
Weakening the equivalence for the positive case
Our semantics is designed to predict that the pairs in (72) and (73) are fully equiv-
alent.
Some readers may take issue with the prediction for the positive case (72). A
first worry is that S believes it’s likely that p might be weaker than S is confident
that p. likely seems to merely requires that the relevant state is ranked above the
midpoint of the relevant ordering, but that confident requires a higher threshold.
Suppose that Irma learns that there is a 51% chance of rain. Then (79a) might be
true, while (79b) is false.
(79) a. Irma thinks it’s likely that it will rain.
b. Irma is confident that it will rain.
A second worry is that confident, but not likely might be subject to pragmatic
encroachment.27 Imagine that Oleg, a week away from retirement, considers a bet
of all of his retirement savings on an event that has a 80% chance of happening.
His friend Laurent might say to Oleg that it is likely that (if he bets) Oleg won’t
lose his savings. Since Oleg trusts Laurent, (80a) seems true; but (80b) seems false.
(80) a. Oleg thinks it’s likely that he would win the bet.
b. Oleg is confident that he would win the bet.
To address these worries, we may simply introduce a minor change in the se-
mantics. We can postulate that the set of states in the extension of likely denotes is
a superset of the set of states in the extension of confident. This assumption dove-
tails with the idea that likely denotes a set of states that are past the midpoint of the
relevant structure, while confident denotes states that are close to the upper end-
point. As a result, the prediction that the sentences in (79) and (80) are equivalent
is weakened to a prediction that they merely have similar meanings.
This change doesn’t affect the equivalence of sentences that involve likely and
confident in the comparative form. This seems a welcome prediction, as you can see
by comparing the comparative forms of the sentences above.
Semantics for belief in a more traditional framework
It’s helpful to see the entry for believe we would use in a more traditional sys-
tem that combines a Hintikka-style possible worlds treatment of belief verbs with
davidsonian event variables. In particular, we take as our reference point the sys-
tem in Hacquard 2006. The innovation we introduce consists in letting the attitude
27We thank [name omitted for blind review] for raising this possibility.
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verb control the ordering that likely operates on (again, following domain seman-
tics accounts in the style of Yalcin 2007).
Assume that the interpretation function is relativized to a 〈D,%〉-structure and
a world. We use again ‘S’ for the semantic type of 〈D,%〉 orderings, ‘P ’ as a metavari-
able over functions from 〈D,%〉-structures to propositions, and ‘doxx’ to denote the
set of doxastic alternatives of x (i.e., x’s belief worlds). The entry for believe is then
as in (81).
(81) ~believeg,〈D,〉 = λs. λP〈S,st〉. λx. λw. holder(x,e) ∧ believe(e,w) ∧
∀w′ ∈ content(s)[P (〈doxx,x〉)(w′) = 1]
The clausal arguments of believe have the same type as (75b) and (76b).28 The
denotation of a belief report involving likely in the complement clause is, schemat-
ically, as in (82).
(82) ~x believes likely p〈W,%〉,g = ∃sv[holder(x,s) ∧ belief(s) ∧ ∀w′ ∈ content(s) :
[∃s′ : θ(s′) ∈Dom(〈doxx,%〉) [likelihood(s′) ∧ θ(s′ ,p) ∧
contrastC(likelihood)(s′)]](w′) = 1
6 Conclusion
This paper has considered the semantics of confidence reports across their nominal
and adjectival uses. We posited that confident and confidence express (neodavidso-
nian) properties of states, type 〈v, t〉. In the bare, or positive form, an attitude-
holder’s confidence state with respect to a given proposition p is contrasted with
their confidence with respect to (at least in some cases) the proposition ¬p. In the
comparative form, more compositionally introduces a mapping from confidence
states to degrees.
Next, we considered how the proposal for confidence reports might extend to
better-studied reports headed by gradable adjectives like likely and probable. Essen-
tially, we applied the (independently motivated) neodavidsonian recipe here, and
got some similarly interesting results. First, we found that we could inject modern
insights about the semantics of such expressions into our states-based framework.
Importantly, the Davidsonian framework allowed us to do this for the nominal
forms as well, without doing violence to the background assumptions about the
distribution and interpretation of the relevant nouns.
In both cases, we posit a division of labor with regards to degree semantics.
Expressions like confident and likelihood carry along information about the sorts
of state structures they are relative to. We exploited these background orderings
in our formulation of a (degree-less) pos morpheme, but we only exploited scales
(i.e., ordered sets of degrees) when dealing with the comparative operator. In this
sense, our architectural proposals echo those made by Bale (2008), who posits a
base ordering associated with the adjective.29
28This may be achieved in various ways. The most obvious one is to adopt a composition rule in
the style of Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) Intensional Functional Application.
29There are some important differences, though. For one thing, Bale’s initial ordering is over indi-
viduals (here, the holders of the states), and the initial ordering is subsumed in a lexical bundle with
a homomorphic mapping to degrees, whereas our structure-preserving map is part of the meaning
of more.
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An interesting aspect of our proposal—a consequence of our adoption of earlier
views on the semantics of more—is that it leaves open the possibility that different
measures may be exploited for the same sentence in different contexts of use—a
possibility so far not open to the theorist who lexically encodes a measure function
as part of the meaning of the adjective or noun. Such cases have been reported for
concrete mass nouns (e.g., more coffee can be used to say something about volume
or weight) and verb phrases (e.g., run more can be used to say something about du-
ration or distance). Reported cases with adjectives are thinner on the ground, but
Dunbar and Wellwood (2016) offer suggestive examples involving comparatives
with taller, redder, and more expensive.
So far, we haven’t found a case that makes crucial use of this flexibility in the
case of confident or likely. Such a case would consist in a scenario where the con-
fidence/probability structures are fixed, yet one and the same comparative form
could be true or false depending on the choice of measure. Such a case would then
represent for confident/confidence or likely/likelihood the equivalent of (83) (based
on an example from Cartwright 1975), which reverses the order of the expressions
introducing the measuranda, yet both can be simultaneously true.
(83) a. There is more water than sand (by volume).
b. There is more sand than water (by weight).
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Appendix
Below are the validites and invalidities discussed in Yalcin (2010). One minor
differences is that Yalcin presents some of these as inferences, we list everything
as a single statement. We convert inferences into material conditional statements
whose antecedents are the conjunctions of the premises in Yalcin’s inferences and
whose consequents are the conclusions of those inferences. We abbreviate likely A
as 4A and A is more likely than B as A  B.
pattern gloss
V1 4A ⊃ ∼4∼A not both A and ∼A are likely
V2 4(A&B) ⊃ (4A&4B) distribution over conjunction
V3 4A ⊃ 4(A∨B) closure under disjunction intro
V4 A  ⊥ A is as likely as ⊥
V5 >  A > is as likely as A
V6 A ⊃ 4A necessities are likely
V7 4A ⊃^A likely things are possible
V8 ((A ⊃ B)) ⊃ (4A→4B) chancy MP
V9 ((A ⊃ B)) ⊃ (∼4B→∼4A) chancy MT
V10 ((A ⊃ B)) ⊃ (B  A) if to 
V11 (B  A & 4A) ⊃ 4B Positive form transfer (v1)
V12 (B  A & A  ∼A) ⊃ (B  ∼B) Positive form transfer (v 2)
I1 (A  B&A  C) ⊃ (A  (B∨C)) Union/Disjunction Property
I2 (A  ∼A) ⊃ (A  B) if A is likely, A is as likely as anything, v.1.
I3 4A ⊃ (A  B) if A is likely, A is as likely as anything, v.2
Instead of giving complete proofs, we sketch how the they can be derived from
the framework in the main text. V1 depends on our claim that contrast maps a
proposition to its negation likely A. If we want to allow different contrast func-
tions, V1 will go invalid, but this is no different from what happens within Yalcin’s
framework.
V2-V5 all depend only on the fact that we evaluate probability claims against a
qualitative probability structure and the fact that we expect that there are as many
probability states as there are sets of worlds in the qualitative probability structure.
So in particular if there is a probability state whose theme is the conjunction A & B
then there must also be a probability state whose theme is A. The inference in
V2 can only fail if it is possible to simultaneously have A & B  ¬(A & B) and
(¬A % A); but this is ruled out by the qualitative additivity principle.
For V6-V10, we need a semantics for the modal operators  and ^.30 Suppose
then that:
~〈W,%〉,g = λA〈s,t〉.∀w ∈W,A(w)
30In V8-V10 Yalcin actually uses conditional premises. We simplify our presentation here by just
supposing that the relevant conditionals are strict conditionals. This choice captures the essence of
Yalcin’s premises, even though it does not capture the full generality of his claim.
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~^〈W,%〉,g = λA〈s,t〉.∃w ∈W,A(w)
Under these assumptions V6-V10 are immediately seen as valid.
For example V6, says that if A is necessary, then it must be likely. But if A is
necessary, then it is equivalent, modulo the qualitative probability structure, to the
tautological proposition. Qualitative additivity ensures that equivalents must be
ranked equally. Moreover, the three principles together entail that > is likely, so
A is likely. This argument also establishes V7 (which is equivalent to A ⊃ ¬4¬A.
And indeed, we have already emphasized that when A is necessary A ≈ > and so
cannot be outranked by its negation. Similar additivity-based arguments establish
V8-V10.
Finally, the transfer principles are guaranteed by the semantics together with
the claim that the measure functions that are invoked in the comparative must
respect the qualitative probability ordering. That is to say, the claim that B is more
likely than A is true according to our semantics relative to a qualitative probability
structure Q if and only if B outranks A in Q. (Call this the correspondence lemma.)
The correspondence lemma is sufficient to establish the invalidity of I1-I3.
Consider, for instance, the disjunction inference I1. There are qualitative prob-
ability structures that do not satisfy the analogous conditions. Let Q′ be such a
structure Consider a model on which Q′ is the index-initial qualitative probability
structure. The the correspondence lemma is going to guarantee that the antecedent
of I1 is true while its consequent is false.
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